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Nevertheless, the first years of operations have indicated
areas which should be restudied and most probably revised. It
has been the writer's duty to review intensively the Louisiana
procedural decisions of the last three years for evaluation in this
faculty symposium. In this, the third and final performance of
this pleasant task, an effort has been made to suggest these few
major problem areas and possible cures, as follows:
1. The need for revision of criteria for compulsory joinder
of necessary and dispensable parties;120
2. The need for Code amendment to prevent the proper-
party articles from being misused to deny substantive justice;12
3. The possible need for rationalization of the incidental
actions and for revision of the requirement for leave of court
to prevent substantive injustice based upon this procedural tech-
nicality;128
4. Consideration of allowing separate trials and adjudica-
tions of severable issues, and of interlocutory appeals with leave,
under limited conditions;129
5. In line with 4, consideration of instituting a rationalized
general policy of allowing separate threshold trial of defenses
which might conclude the litigation, in place of the present
scheme of specialized exceptions with function delineated by
chiefly historical considerations.130
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
SEARCH WARRANTS-REQUISITE RECITALS OF SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT
Mapp v. Ohio," holding that illegally seized evidence is inad-
missible in state as well as federal courts, necessitated a careful
review of state search warrant procedures. It is important that
search warrants be validly issued, to the end that the property
seized will be admissible in evidence in subsquent criminal pro-
ceedings. Thus, article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
126. See text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 32-33 smpra.
128. See text accompanying notes 61-62 and 67-69 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 70-81 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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states that "A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause
established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a
credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause for issu-
ance of the warrant." (Emphasis added.) In State v. Wells2 this
provision was applied in holding a search warrant to have been
illegally issued "because the affidavit upon which it was based
recites nothing more than that the officer seeking the warrant
...has reasonable cause to suspect" that weapons might be
found in the premises to be searched. Justice Hamiter's opinion
underscored the purpose and effect of article 162, when he stated
that it "now leaves no doubt but that a search warrant can legally
issue in this state only when an affidavit has been submitted to
the judge and such affidavit recites facts which satisfy him, the
judge, not the affiant, that probable cause exists for its issu-
ance."' Justice Hamiter then points out that it is the clear pur-
pose of article 162 that the judge is to determine if the search
warrant is to be issued upon the basis of facts stated in the affi-
davit. He is not simply to rubber-stamp the investigating officer's
determination that there is probable cause. The importance of
the statement of facts, to serve as a basis for issuance of the
search warrant, cannot be overemphasized by those who instruct
peace officers in the preparation of affidavits for search warrants.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS-EFFECT OF INDICTMENT
BY GRAND JURY
One of the purposes of the preliminary examination is to
determine whether there is "probable cause" to charge the ac-
cused with the offense for which he is held. The scope of the
preliminary examination after the defendant has been indicted
is stated in article 296 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After
a grand jury has considered the case and returned an indict-
ment, the issue of probable cause to charge the accused has been
authoritatively determined; and the grand jury's finding estab-
lishes a sufficient prima facie case of guilt to justify holding the
defendant. Thus a preliminary examination after an indictment
is expressly "limited to the perpetuation of testimony and the
fixing of bail."4 The paramount significance of the grand jury's
investigation and finding is logically and clearly illustrated by
the procedures approved in State v. Hudson.5 In Hudson the de-
2. 253 La. 925, 929, 221 So.2d 50, 52 (1969).
3. Id. at 931, 221 So.2d at 52.
4. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 296, last paragraph.
5. 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969).
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fendants had been arrested on a murder charge and a preliminary
examination had been ordered for June 2, 1967. Upon being in-
formed that the murder charge was pending before the grand
jury, the judge continued the preliminary examination until June
8. However, the grand jury returned a murder indictment on
June 7 and a preliminary examination to consider possible bail
was not held until June 30. In approving the procedures fol-
lowed, the supreme court held that the five-day delay, to await
the grand jury's disposition of the charge, "did not breach the
mandate of article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure di-
recting that the judge 'immediately' order a preliminary ex-
amination in felony cases." In his opinion, Justice Summers
pointed out that both procedures are "designed primarily to as-
certain whether there is probable cause to charge the defendant
with the offense,"' and it is implicit in Hudson that the important
issue of probable cause to hold the defendant for trial had been
settled by the grand jury's indictment. Recognizing practical
considerations, the court stated: "Nor do we feel that the law
requires the district attorney to present the same case in dif-
ferent forums at the same time"; and concluded that "the lan-
guage of article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring
that the judge 'immediately' order a preliminary examination
in felony cases is not to be so rigidly applied that it brings about
the abolition of the judge's right to grant a continuance in these
cases.' 7 The Hudson opinion provides a fine supplement to, and
workable application of, the basic rule enunciated in article 296
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been ap-
plied, in two recent cases,8 to support the court's refusal to order
a preliminary examination after the defendant has been indicted
by a grand jury. In State v. Singleton, in upholding the trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial, Justice McCaleb stated,
"In the first place there is no constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing,9 and the law is well settled in this state and under the
federal system that since the purpose of a preliminary hearing
is to determine probable cause, no such hearing is required where
6. Id. at 1009, 221 So.2d at 490.
7. 253 La. 992, 1010, 221 So.2d 484, 490 (1969).
8. State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So.2d 369 (1969); State v. Singleton,
253 La. 18, 215 So.2d 838 (1968).
9. Accord, Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d cir. 1967).
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the defendant has been indicted by a Grand Jury because the fact
of indictment evidences probable cause."'1
INDICTMENTS-CHARGING PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Article 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure articulates the
procedure, in conformity with prior jurisprudential rules, for
charging prior convictions to establish multiple offender liability.
Where the offense, such as driving while intoxicated, is graded
according to whether the violator is a first, second, or subsequent
offender, it is necessary to allege the prior convictions in the in-
dictment. Such an allegation is essential if the defendant is to
be convicted as a second or subsequent offender." The first para-
graph of article 483 states the method of charging such prior
convictions, that is, "the name or nature of the offense and the
fact, date, and court of the conviction" must be alleged. This pro-
cedure must be followed. In State v. Bass 2 an affidavit for driv-
ing while intoxicated contained the notation "Second Offense,"
which was held insufficient to charge a prior conviction. Thus,
the sentence as a second offender was illegal and the case was
remanded for a proper sentence as a first offender.
CHOICE OF CHARGE WHERE Two POSSIBLE CRIMES
It is inevitable that there will be some overlap of the broadly
stated basic offenses of the Criminal Code and special criminal
statutes, or even special offenses in the Code itself. In such situ-
ations, article 4 of the Code 1 provides that "prosecution may
proceed under either provision, in the discretion of the district
attorney" (emphasis added), thus expressly negating the possible
rule that the special provision would be applicable to the ex-
clusion of the general crime. It should be noted that article 4
permits a choice of prosecutions, but does not authorize dual
prosecutions. This provision was understandably and logically
applied in State v. Orr 4 where the defendant was prosecuted for
stealing a bull calf. This offense could have been charged as cattle
theft under a special statute which makes the offense a felony,
regardless of the value of the animal stolen, and prescribes the
severe penalty of from one to ten years in the State Penitentiary."5
10. 253 La. 18, 24, 215 So.2d 838, 839 (1968).
11. State v. Compagno, 125 La. 669, 671, 51 So. 681, 682 (1910).
12. 254 La. 83, 222 So.2d 865 (1969).
13. LA. R.S. 14:4 (1950).
14. 253 La. 752, 219 So.2d 775 (1969).
15. LA. R.S. 14:67.1 (Supp. 1969).
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Rather than invoke the draconic penalty of the cattle theft law,
the district attorney chose to charge the defendant with the mis-
demeanor of petty theft (of a bull calf valued at eighteen dol-
lars) under the general theft article of the Criminal Code. In
upholding the district attorney's authority to prosecute for the
lesser offense, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied article 4 of
the Criminal Code. The district attorney's choice to prosecute
for the misdemeanor of petty theft resulted in the defendant's
being tried for a crime that was more in keeping with the nature
of his transgressions, for the cattle theft law should be limited
to aggravated cases. It would also have precluded the necessity
for a jury trial, except for the unfortunate circumstance that the
penalty for attempted theft (fixed before the Duncan rule was
envisioned) exceeded the "petty offense" standard.11
SEVERANCE-ON GRouND DEFENDANT WISHES TO -CALL
Co-DFFNDAT AS A WITNESS
Article 704 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
court to grant a severance on motion of the defendant when it
"is satisfied that justice requires a severance." Thus, if the co-
defendants have antagonistic defenses, or will submit directly
contradictory evidence, a severance should be granted.17 A more
difficult problem arises in cases like State v. Vale 8 where the
jointly indicted defendant moves for a severance in order that
he may call his co-defendant as a witness, which would be im-
possible if they were tried together. 9 In Vale the defendant
argued, on appeal, that the refusal of a severance had deprived
him of the right to call his co-defendant (brother) as a witness.
The brother had taken full blame for the narcotics and para-
phernalia concealed in the house in which they resided. In sus-
taining the trial court's ruling, the supreme court pointed out
that "the statement alluded to his brother reached the jury
through the testimony of the officers. . .. " 0 Chief Justice Fournet
pointed out that "severance on joint trials is not a matter of
right . . . merely because one co-defendant may desire or be
willing to testify for the other co-defendants."2'
The key to the Vale decision was brought into clear focus
16. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
17. see iA. CODE CraM. P. art. 704, comments (a) and (c), and cases cited.
18. 252 La. 1056, 215 So.2d 811 (1968).
19. See LA. R.S. 15:461(3) (1950).
20. State v. Vale, 252 La. 1056, 1075, 215 So.2d 811, 817-818 (1968).
21. Id.
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when Chief Justice Fournet distinguished the case of United
States v. Echeles,22 which had been relied upon by defendant, as
follows: "In the Echeles case the court found that Echeles' cause
was prejudiced in denying him a severance from his co-defendant,
a former client, because of his inability to call him to testify to
obtain evidence of prior statements holding Echeles blameless,
whereas in the instant case, it cannot be said James was preju-
diced for his co-defendant's prior statements claiming full re-
sponsibility and ownership of the narcotics and paraphernalia
forming the basis of this suit was introduced into evidence,
reaching the jury through the testimony of the officers. '23
CONTINUANCES
The continuance articles of the 1966 Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure24 provided a more complete coverage of this important
device than the corresponding provisions of the 1928 Code, draw-
ing upon the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure for additional
rules. These provisions were logically applied in a number of
recent cases. In State v. Devenow25 the supreme court upheld
the trial judge's overruling of defense counsel's motion for a
continuance which was not in writing and did not specify the
grounds upon which it was based, as required by article 707 of
the Code.20 In addition to the formal insufficiency of the motion,
the court pointed out that there was no real need for a continu-
ance. The trial judge's per curiam stated, "Defense counsel had
been employed for thirty days and the trial was then set for six
days away, which is adequate to prepare for trial." It was
stressed that the trial "was not a complicated one" and "no
special circumstances were shown."8 In this regard it is signifi-
cant to note that article 712 stresses the discretionary nature of
the court's ruling upon a motion for a continuance. In State v.
Bland29 the supreme court again upheld the trial judge's refusal
of a continuance where the grounds alleged were not significant.
The ground that the defendant, who was represented by court-
22. 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965).
23. State v. Vale, 252 La. 1056, 1078, 215 So.2d 811, 818 (1968).
24. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 707-715.
25. 253 La. 796, 220 So.2d 78 (1969).
26. Cf. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts 961, 1603 with respect to oral continuance in
civil cases.
27. State v. Devenow, 253 La. 796, 806, 220 So.2d 78, 82 (1969).
28. Id.
29. 253 La. 185, 217 So.2d 195 (1969).
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appointed counsel, needed time to arrange for private counsel
did not impress the court since the defendant had already had
sufficient time to procure counsel. The motion made the day be-
fore the case was set for trial impressed the court as a dilatory
tactic. It was also a bit late to decide suddenly that additional
time was needed to subpoena two out-of-state witnesses (from
Houston, Texas). Also, defense counsel had failed to follow the
requirements of article 709 as to the facts which must be stated
in a motion for a continuance to secure the presence of absent
witnesses. Article 489 provides for a continuance where the de-
fendant "has been prejudiced in his defense on the merits" by a
defect in the indictment, or variance with the evidence, which
has been cured by amendment of the indictment or bill of par-
ticulars. Thus, if the defendant were relying on an alibi for a
certain date or time of day, and that date or time were changed
by amendment, the defense would be entitled to a reasonable
time to prepare to meet this unexpected change in the charge. 80
In State v. Lewis8l the court properly refused a continuance,
holding that the defendant had not been prejudiced or surprised
by amendment of the indictment to properly connect the dis-
junctively stated elements of the crime by the word "and," rather
than "or," so as to conform with the proper statutory method of
charging such crimes.82 There had been no showing that the de-
fendant was misled as to the nature of the charge by the correc-
tion of the defectively stated indictment. It is prejudice, not
mere change in the form of the charge, which is necessary in
order to establish the right to a continuance.
CAPACITY TO. STAND TRIAL-INDUCED BY TRANQUILIZER
The test of capacity to proceed with the trial, stated in article
641 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, conforms with the prior
lawss and is a test that has been almost universally adopted. The
issue is whether "as a result of mental disease or defect, a de-
fendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceed-
ings against him or to assist in his defense." (Emphasis added.)
This test is simply stated and generally provides a very under-
standable measure for the determination of capacity to stand
trial. A difficult question has been presented, however, by the
30. State v. Singleton, 169 La. 191, 124 So. 824 (1929).
81. 253 La. 230, 217 So.2d 381 (1968).
32. LA.1 CODE CruM. P. art 480.
33. Former LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
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tranquilized defendant,84 that is, the defendant whose mental
capability is maintained through the use of prescribed medica-
tion. Does this defendant meet the test of article 641? Two recent
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions have answered this question
in the affirmative. In State v. Plaisance,8 5 and more recently in
State v. Hampton,86 the court upheld the competency of a de-
fendant who, as a result of the administration of a tranquilizing
drug, was able to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to assist in his defense. In Hampton, Justice
Sanders stated, "[the test of present insanity under the above
article [art. 641] is whether the defendant presently lacks the
capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his de-
fense."87 (Emphasis by court.) After pointing out that the unre-
futed testimony of the sanity commission was to the effect that
the defendant was capable of understanding the proceedings and
assisting in her defense, Justice Sanders concluded, "The psy-
6hotic symptoms are in remission. That this condition resulted
from the use of prescribed tranquilizing medication is of no legal
consequence. Under the codal test the court looks to the condi-
tion only. It does not look beyond existing competency and erase
improvement produced by medical science. '88 The question of
competency of a tranquilized defendant has not been passed upon
in most jurisdictions. However, an Ohio court recently held that
a defendant was competent to stand trial where tranquilizing
drugs administered under proper medical direction would permit
him to communicate with counsel in an apparently reasonable
and rational manner as to the preparation and conduct of his
defense.8 9
The result reached in Hampton is a logical application of the
test of present capacity to stand trial which is stated in article
641 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also achieves a sound
and desirable result, for it enables the state to try the defendant
whenever he is actually capable of effectively assisting in his
defense. For the innocent defendant it means an opportunity to
establish his innocence, rather than to spend the remainder of
his life as a "forgotten man" in the criminally insane ward of
a mental hospital. Where the defendant is guilty, it means that
34. See Note, 29 LA. L. REv. 265 (1968).
35. 252 La. 212, 210 So.2d 323 (1968).
86. 253 La. 399, 218 So.2d 311 (1969).
37. Id. at 403, 218 So.2d at 312.
38. Id. at 401, 218 So.2d at 311.
39. State v. Rand, 247 N.E.2d 343 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1969).
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the state can bring him to trial while key witnesses are still
available and their memories are reasonably fresh and depend-
able.
JURY TRIAL-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT NOT IMPLICIT IN
DUNCAN V. STATE OF LOUISIANA
The United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana
held that a charge of simple battery, with a maximum possible
prison sentence of two years, must be tried by a jury. In holding
that the sixth amendment guaranty of a jury trial was appli-
cable to state criminal proceedings via the "due process" clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court characterized
the right to trial by jury as an integral part of due process for a
defendant charged with a "serious crime." While the Duncan
opinion refused to define a "serious crime," where a jury is re-
quired, there is much in the opinion which indicates that the
Court approves the line drawn in the federal court system, where
"petty offenses" are defined as those punishable by no more than
six months in prison and a $500 fine.41 In 1968 the Louisiana legis-
lature amended article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
conform with the apparent federal standard, providing for trial
misdemeanors by a five-man jury where the maximum possible
prison sentence exceeded six months, or a fine in excess of $500
might be imposed. Another 1968 statute reduced the maximum
penalty for nineteen Criminal Code misdemeanors to six months,
so that those offenses would meet the petty offense standard and
would be triable without a jury.4
A related question" was raised, but not answered, in Duncan.
Does compliance with "due process" require states to provide a
common law and federal type of jury with twelve members who
must reach a unanimous verdict? A petition for a rehearing which
raised this vital issue was denied in Duncan.48 Two recent Lou-
isiana Supreme Court decisions have rejected the defendant's
attempt to read into Duncan the common law understanding of
a unanimous jury verdict. While a great majority ,of the states
have adopted the common law jury, it is significant that several
states have procedures which are not in accord with the common
law standards.44 Also, even in England, where the common law
40. 391 U.S. 145 (1968), discussed in Comment, 29 LA. L. REv. 118 (1968).
41. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
42. La. Acts 1968, No. 647.
43. Duncan v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
44. See Comment, 29 LA. L. Rzv. 118, 128 n.55 (1968).
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jury developed, the trial may be by a jury of less than twelve and
a unanimous verdict is no longer required.45
The fact that the United States Supreme Court might not
impose the federal concept of a unanimous twelve-man jury on
the states was indicated by its reply to Louisiana's objection to
the application of the sixth amendment standard of a twelve-
man jury and a unanimous verdict to the states. In relation to
this objection Mr. Justice White stated, "It seems very unlikely
to us that our decision today will require widespread changes in
state criminal processes. First, our decisions interpreting the
sixth amendment are always subject to reconsideration, a fact
amply demonstrated by the instant decision. '4 6 This statement in
Duncan was emphasized by Chief Justice Fournet in State v.
Dunn 7 when the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that the Duncan decision called for a unanimous verdict in
all twelve-man jury cases. In State v. Whiten the Louisiana
Supreme Court similarly upheld Louisiana's constitutional pro-
vision for a nine-out-of-twelve verdict in major felony trials,4 9
and Justice Hamlin stated, "We must await a clear exposition of
this point by the Federal Supreme Court before we can decide
whether a unanimous verdict is a requirement of the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which is obligatory on
the States."50 This is a matter upon which the Louisiana Supreme
Court is certainly justified in adopting a policy of watchful wait-
ing, for there is serious doubt as to whether the Supreme Court
will or should hold that the particular type of jury used in the
federal courts and at common law is so sacramental that it is
essential to "due process" of law. It is one thing to hold that a
jury trial is required for the trial of serious crimes, but quite an-
other to say that only a particular type of jury will satisfy stan-
dards of fundamental fairness.
OTHER RECENT DUNCAN RULINGS
State v. Watson5 ' held that the Duncan requirement should
only be given prospective effect, and could not be urged to in-
validate a conviction of aggravated assault which failed to meet
45. Eng. Criminal Justice Act of 1967, ch. 80, § 13.1.
46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
47. 223 So.2d 856 (La. 1969).
48. 223 So.2d 843 (La. 1969).
49. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41.
50. 223 So.2d 843, 846 (La. 1969).
51. 252 La. 649, 212 So.2d 415 (1968).
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Duncan standards.52 The correctness of the Louisiana Supreme
Court's holding was borne out by a subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision which held that the Duncan rule should
only be applied prospectively."
One of the 1968 misdemeanor penalty reductions to meet the
Duncan petty offense standard was for petty theft (amount less
than twenty dollars) committed by a first offender.54 This amend-
ment had failed to take into account the fact that the penalty for
attempted theft, regardless of the amount the defendant was at-
tempting to steal, could be as much as imprisonment for one
year.5 5 In State v. Orr56 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
petty theft of a bull calf valued at eighteen dollars must be tried
by a jury, since attempted theft was a responsive verdict and
that offense carried a possible penalty of imprisonment for one
year. The Orr decision is eminently sound in view of the present
state of the statute law. However, it is highly desirable to elimi-
nate the incongruity of having a higher penalty for attempted
petty theft or receiving stolen things than for the completed
crimes. It is also important to relieve the overcrowded jury doc-
kets of the necessity of jury trials for petty theft and receiving,
which are offenses of a minor nature. Both of these objectives
can be accomplished by reducing the maximum penalty for at-
tempted theft and receiving to six months imprisonment, and
it is hoped that such legislation- will be enacted in 1970.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Two 1968-69 decisions continued the Louisiana Supreme
Court's well-established policy that "applications for new trials
when based on the ground of newly discovered evidence should
be received with extreme caution .... ,57 The test "... is not
simply whether another jury might bring in a different verdict-
52. Conviction, without a jury, of aggravated assault which carried a
maximum penalty of imprisonment for two years.
53. De Stenfano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), cited in footnote to State
v. Watson, 252 La. 649, 651, 212 So.2d 415, 416 (1968).
54. LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1969).
55. The attempt article of the Criminal Code, LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950), gen-
erally fixes the penalty at one-half of the penalty for the crime attempted.
An exception was made for attempted theft and attempted receiving stolen
things. Those attempts, unlike the basic crimes attempted, are not graded
according to value of the stolen goods, since it is not always possible to prove
how much the defendant was attempting to steal or receive. Thus, a flat
maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment was set for attempted theft
or receiving.
56. 253 La. 752, 219 So.2d 775 (1969).
57. State v. Jackson, 253 La. 205, 214, 217 So.2d 372, 375 (1969).
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that is a speculative matter-it is whether the new evidence is
'so' material that it ought to produce a different result than the
verdict reached. ..'."58 (Emphasis added.) In general, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has shown a commendable reluctance
to interfere with the trial court's ruling on this question, for the
importance of the new evidence can best be determined by the
court which had firsthand knowledge of the evidence adduced
at the trial.
APPEALS-POST-CONVICTION RULINGS
Article 912 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists a num-
ber of final judgments or rulings which are appealable, but ex-
pressly states that this enumeration is not exclusive. Further
clarification of the scope of the right of appeal was provided in
two 1969 Louisiana Supreme Court decisions which held that the
right of appeal was inapplicable to post-conviction rulings. In
State v. Augustine0 the supreme court held that it lacked juris-
diction to entertain an appeal from a post-conviction ruling that
the defendant was presently sane and subject to execution of the
sentence of capital punishment. Justice Hamiter, writing for a
unanimous court, pointed out that the remedy when a review
of the trial judge's post-conviction ruling on present sanity of
the convicted defendant is sought, is by supervisory writs. In
State v. Bruno ° the supreme court refused to entertain an appeal
from the trial court's revocation of a suspended sentence, holding
that such ruling can only be reviewed under its supervisory juris-
diction. The supreme court's holdings in Augustine and Bruno
are supported by practical considerations, by prior jurisprudence
(cited by Justice Hamiter in Augustine) and by the fact that
none of the enumerated judgments or rulings appealable in article
912 are post-conviction rulings.
APPEALS-EFFECT oF ESCAPE PENDING APPEAL
Former La. R.S. 15:548 provided that if the appellant was a
fugitive from justice on the return day or the day fixed for the
appeal, the appeal would be dismissed. This provision was pur-
posely omitted from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the
Reporter's Comment stated that the omission was "because it is
58. Id. at 215, 217 So.2d at 375. Accord, State v. Williams, 252 La. 1023,
215 So.2d 799 (1968).
59. 254 La. 32, 222 So.2d 502 (1969).
60. 253 La. 669, 219 So.2d 490 (1969).
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unfair to the defendant," to impose this extreme penalty upon
the escapee.61 In State v. Lampkin 2 the intended deletion of the
draconic forfeiture provision was given effect, and the Code
Comment was followed in holding that the escape of a convicted
burglar did not have the pre-Code effect of automatic forfeiture
of his appeal. Dissenting Justice Barham disagreed with the
majority of the court and with the Code Reporter as to the effect
of the deletion of former La. R.S. 15: 548. Justice Barham pointed
out that the dismissal procedure enunciated in section 548 of the
1928 Code "had been the law by judicial pronouncement" since
1884, and was merely carried forward in that Code. However, re-
gardless of the source of La. R.S. 15:548, its repeal and deletion
from the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, along with the Re-
porter's Comment, would appear to justify the majority of the
supreme court in recognizing the legislative demise of that rule.
The situation might have been different if the rule had remained
a rule of the jurisprudence, but it had been codified in 1928 and
then repealed in 1966.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
RELEVANCY
Other Crimes
In State v. Crook,1 an aggravated rape case, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's permitting the prosecution to show
that five days before the alleged rape for which he was being
tried, defendant had raped another young woman under similar
circumstances in another section of the city. The court said that
it is admissible "for corroboration and to show the intent and
licentious disposition of defendant."2 Justice Barham wrote an
eloquent dissenting opinion, analyzing pertinent legislation and
prior statutory provisions. He forcefully contends that in the past
the Louisiana Supreme Court at times has given too broad an
interpretation to the so-called knowledge-intent-plan exception
61. LA. CODe CRIM. P. art. 919, Comment (c) further explains: "For ex-
ample, if a man has appealed from a death sentence and he escapes, under
the provisions of former R.S. 15:548 the effect is to make the escape a capital
offense, since he loses his right of appeal ......
62. 253 La. 337, 218 So.2d 289 (1969).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969).
2. Id. at 973, 221 So.2d at 477.
